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Neomalthusians have regularly predicted "water wars" while cornucopians have argued that there is no
inherent water scarcity and liberal institutionalists have seen cooperation as a more likely outcome of
competition for limited water resources than violent conﬂict. Three earlier studies have found a positive
statistical relationship between shared rivers and low-level interstate conﬂict. Based on a more
comprehensive dataset, an improved model of conﬂict, and a more appropriate control for geographical
opportunity, we argue that these results are spurious and that we cannot establish a conﬂict-inducing
effect of shared rivers over and beyond contiguity itself. In fact, the new dataset presented here
makes it clear that nearly all neighbors in the international system share at least one river. This calls for
a different approach to investigating interaction in shared river basins. This notwithstanding, freshwater
and other shared resources may still provide a mechanism to explain why contiguity is robustly asso-
ciated with conﬂict, so the water-conﬂict scenario cannot be dismissed. Indeed, our results show that
among river-sharing states, basins with an upstream/downstream conﬁguration increase the risk of
conﬂict. The article ﬁnally discusses how river interaction should be further investigated based on these
results and what new data are needed to enable such research.
 2012 Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.Introduction
In a widely cited article, Vasquez (1995) discusses three
competing explanations for the robust relationship between
contiguity and war. Wars between neighbors may occur because
such states have the greatest opportunity to ﬁght, as a result of
a higher frequency of overall interaction, or as a result of conﬂicts of
interest over territory. Vasquez favors the territorial explanation (cf.
also Holsti, 1991; Huth, 1996). Territory is considered a vital
resource in its own right, with symbolic as well as military and
economic importance, but it can also harbor other natural
resources that may affect states’ willingness to ﬁght.
One such resource is freshwater. Among the natural resources
featured in the conﬂict literature, competition for shared water
resources holds a prominent place. Although this literature tradi-
tionally was dominated by case studies (e.g. Elhance, 1999; Homer-
Dixon, 1994, 1999; Lowi, 1995), three large-n studies (Furlong,
Gleditsch, & Hegre, 2006; Gleditsch, Furlong, Hegre, Lacina, &
Owen, 2006; Toset, Gleditsch, & Hegre, 2000) have expanded
general statistical models of interstate war to include a variable
assessing whether or not two states share at least one river and ﬁnd
that sharing a river increases the probability that states willþ47 22 54 77 01.
(M. Brochmann), nilspg@
-NC-ND license.experience low-level dyadic conﬂict. This is consistent with the
neomalthusian scenario of violent competition for access to limited
freshwater resources. Here we re-examine the river-conﬂict nexus
with an extensively revised and updated dataset of shared rivers,
a gravity model of conﬂict as a baseline, and with proper controls
for proximity. We show that it is impossible to disentangle the
effect of sharing a river from the effect of being neighbors and that
in fact almost all neighboring states in the international system
share at least one river. To conclude in favor of a neomalthusian
argument about willingness to ﬁght over sharedwater resources, as
the previous studies have done, is premature. The earlier studies
may simply capture a contiguity effect. On the other hand, shared
water resources may be amechanism behind the robust association
between contiguity and war. We do ﬁnd, when examining river-
sharing dyads only, that dyads with an upstream/downstream
relationship along a river have an increased risk of experiencing
conﬂict. We ﬁnally discuss what data will be needed to investigate
further the possible links between sharing rivers and conﬂict risk.
Why do neighbors ﬁght?
Interactions between states are shaped by opportunity and
willingness (Most & Starr, 1989; Starr, 1978). Opportunity repre-
sents the total set of constraints and possibilities available within
a given environment. Willingness is the process of choice or the
selection of speciﬁc behavior by decision makers. Opportunity is
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different measures of proximity, notably contiguity, inter-capital
distance, or minimum distance (Buhaug & Gleditsch, 2006). Will-
ingness on the other hand has remained a somewhat more elusive
concept, measured by such variables as alliances, voting prefer-
ences, or democracy (Mitchell & Prins, 1999). However, geograph-
ical factors can also shape states’ willingness to ﬁght, as argued by
Vasquez (1995) and others: Adjacent territory provides states with
more than an interaction opportunity. A traditional realist expla-
nation would suggest that neighbors ﬁght more simply because
they have the opportunity to do so. States are better able to project
force close to home than at long distances (e.g. Boulding, 1962).
Alternatively, the higher frequency of war between neighbors may
be related to the higher frequency of interaction overall between
neighbors. Greater interaction opportunity increases the number of
issues of potential disagreement, and some of the disputes are
likely to escalate to violence. Finally, the territorial explanation
favored by Vasquez argues that it is the value of a state’s territory
that increases its willingness to go to war. Proximity may provide
an opportunity to go to war, but threatened or contested territory
also makes state leaders willing to use force. Wars are more
common among neighbors than other states because they have
territorial disputes (Vasquez, 1995). Besides the intrinsic value of
territory, control over territory may secure access to other vital
natural resources.
More attentive to the actual interaction and less to systemic
factors, researchers with a focus on contentious issues as drivers of
international relations argue that state leaders focus on achieving
control of speciﬁc contentious issues when they engage in inter-
actions with other states (e.g. Diehl, 1992; Hensel, 2001; Hensel,
Mitchell, Sowers, & Thyne, 2008; Mansbach & Vasquez, 1981;
Mitchell & Hensel, 2007; Mitchell & Prins, 1999). In general the
nature of the issue, the degree to which it is tangible or not (e.g.
Vasquez, 1983) and its salience (e.g. Hensel, 2001) are typically held
as decisive for the nature of inter-state interaction. Furthermore, in
order for states to interact over contentious issues, there needs to
be an underlying difference of interest warranting some form of
adjustment of behavior.
Why would states ﬁght over rivers?
A shared river ﬁts the general characteristics of a possibly
contentious issue, and much of the world’s freshwater runs in
international rivers, transcending regions without regard for
national frontiers. Riparian states depend on a relatively ﬁxed
amount of water, and thus become highly interdependent. For as
many as 39 countries, home to more than 800 million people, at
least half of their water resources originate beyond their borders
(UNDP, 2006: 210). Egypt, admittedly an extreme case in this
respect, is dependent on the Nile for 97% of its water and 95% of the
Nile water originates outside Egypt (Gleick, 1993: 86).
Access to sufﬁcient amounts of freshwater is absolutely essential
for all aspects of human life and industry, and water has no
substitute. Consequently, differing interests emerging over water at
the international level are likely to be highly salient issues. Salience,
understood as the overall value that is attached to the river by each
riparian (Hensel et al., 2008), is thus ﬁrst and foremost related to
the amount of available water relative to the demand on the water
source. But, in addition factors such as the navigational value of the
river, the degree to which it is used to exploit ﬁsh stocks, whether
there is a presence some other resource-extraction industry on the
river, whether or not there are any hydropower plants along the
river, or whether the river is used for irrigation purposes also
contribute to river salience (Hensel & Brochmann, 2007; Hensel,
Mitchell, & Sowers, 2006). A highly salient river put to multipleuses is likely to stimulate more interaction in general and more
conﬂict in particular (Hensel et al., 2008).
Complicating matters further, river-sharing relationships are
inherently asymmetric. Typically, the upstream state is considered
to have the upper-hand in river relations since the state with
control of the headwaters of a basin has uninterrupted access to the
river’s water. Any action taken by an upstream state may result in
a unidirectional externality for the state downstream, (Barrett,
2003; Bernauer, 2002), i.e. a burden for the downstream state at
no cost to the upstream state. As the state furthest downstream on
the Nile, Egypt is highly vulnerable to any action taken upstream.
This has led Egyptian politicians to make a number of militant
statements such as “The only matter that could take Egypt to war
again is water” and “the next war in our region will be over water,
not politics”.1 However, asymmetric relations in international river
basins do not always favor the upstream state, although that will
often be the case where the nature of the contentious issue relates
to water quantity or quality (i.e. pollution). As noted, international
rivers are also important to riparians because of ﬁsh stocks and for
navigation. When it comes to navigation, the downstream state can
block upstream states from access to important harbors or to the
sea, thus limiting their participation in international trade.
According to Collier (2007), being landlocked is one of the critical
development traps. Thus, navigation issues could potentially
reduce the advantage of being an upstream state. Traditionally,
navigation was the biggest concern relating to interaction over
shared rivers, something that is reﬂected in the early stages of
international water law (Allouche, 2005). Current research on
water and conﬂict is mostly concerned with the water quality and
quantity issues relating to freshwater (Tir & Ackerman, 2009).
Nevertheless, these different types of potential conﬂicts illustrate
the complexity of river-sharing as a contentious issue in world
politics.
As Wolf, Kramer, Carius, and Dabelko (2005: pp. 80e95, 203e
206) have argued, however, the modern world has yet to see
a large-scale war primarily over water, but some scholars as well as
policy makers have warned that such wars are likely to occur,
exacerbated especially by population growth and climate change
(Bernauer & Siegfried, 2012; Tir & Stinnett, 2012).2
In particular, scholars with a neomalthusian view of interna-
tional affairs argue that shared water resources can become issues
of national security if the resource is depleted and becomes scarce
due to reduced supply (pollution or reduced water ﬂow), increased
demand (resulting from population growth or increased standard
of living), or because the resource is unevenly distributed (Homer-
Dixon, 1994). Case studies of various river basins (e.g. Elhance,
1999: Homer-Dixon, 1994; Kalpakian, 2004; Lowi, 1995) tend to
emphasize the conﬂict potential in many of the rivers investigated
and how water disputes are highly interconnected with other
political and socio-economic factors shaping inter-state relations.
But still, there is little evidence for the occurrence of “water wars”
or even a credible threat of one.
That notwithstanding, wars rarely have a single cause, and
water disputes can exacerbate already existing hostilities in a dyad
due to the complexity and salience of these issues. It is widely
argued, although contested, for instance, that at least part of the
cause of the 1967 war in the Middle East was the attempt by
members of the Arab League to divert the headwaters of the Jordan
River away from Israel (Elhance, 1999; Gleick, 1993). The most
recent version of the Paciﬁc Institute’s Water Conﬂict Chronology
lists 225 historical and on-going instances wherewater is related to
conﬂict (Gleick, 2010). In most of these disputes, however, water is
an instrument of war or a strategic target, rather than a resource at
the root of the dispute. Although the number of statistical studies
of interaction in international rivers is increasing rapidly (e.g.
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Tir & Stinnett, 2012; Yoffe, Wolf, & Giordano, 2003), only three
large-n studies have investigated the relationship between sharing
a river and the risk of international conﬂict in general applying
traditional models of conﬂict (Furlong et al., 2006; Gleditsch et al.,
2006; Toset et al., 2000). All of them ﬁnd that river-sharing states
have a higher risk of conﬂict compared to non-river-sharing states
ceteris paribus. The ﬁrst, Toset et al. (2000), investigates contiguous
dyads for the period 1880e92 and a shorter period 1980e92 based
on a list of 214 international rivers recoded into 13,707 contiguous
shared-river-dyad-years. In models with standard controls for the
risk of conﬂict, the results show that river-sharing states have more
conﬂict; that the more rivers two states share, the higher the risk of
conﬂict outbreak; and that upstream/downstream dyads have
a higher conﬂict propensity. Since they only investigate contiguous
dyads they do not include additional controls for proximity.
However, many rivers are missing from their dataset and the
models testing the different river conﬁgurations are only run for
the short time period. Moreover, the upstream/downstream cases
are compared to all contiguous dyads instead of all river-sharing
dyads, and this undermines the authors’ argument that conﬂict is
more likely in upstream/downstream rivers compared to rivers with
other conﬁgurations.
The second article (Furlong et al., 2006) uses mainly the same
research design and data, but includes a measure for the length of
the land boundary between two states in order to test if the shared-
river variable might be a proxy for increased interaction opportu-
nities between states with long, shared borders (because states
with long joint borders are more likely to have shared rivers). The
boundary length hypothesis does not ﬁnd general support, but for
the short period sharing a river is no longer signiﬁcant when
boundary length is introduced.
The third study (Gleditsch et al., 2006) introduces an improved
dataset coded based on river basins3 rather than single rivers
(Owen, Furlong, & Gleditsch, 2004) that includes non-contiguous
dyads in the same basin, based on the international river basins
provided in the Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database, TFDD
(Wolf, Natharius, Danielson, Ward, & Pender, 1999). This enables
the authors to distinguish more clearly between an upstream/
downstream relationship and a river-boundary relationship and to
test the alternative hypothesis that dyads with a river boundary
might have conﬂicts over disputed territory in the river. However,
this hypothesis is not supported. The relationship between sharing
a river and dyadic conﬂict survives another challenge. This study
also establishes that the total size of the shared river basin is
associated with conﬂict.
In addition to examining the effect of merely sharing a river, all
the three studies focus on water stress in some form. Toset et al.
(2000) and Furlong et al. (2006) use a measure for water avail-
ability (from Hauge & Ellingsen,1998), and ﬁnd that in dyads where
one or both of the countries have low water availability, there is
a higher risk of conﬂict but interacting the water availability vari-
able with whether or not states share a river, leads to inconclusive
results. Water availability is however only measured as a snapshot,
so it does not capture variation over time, or seasonal variation, and
it does not take national water demand into account.
Gleditsch et al. (2006) improve the controls for water avail-
ability or stress in several ways. First, they include a measure for
average rainfall and ﬁnd that low rainfall increases the risk of
conﬂict, but actually reduces the conﬂict risk when interacted with
shared basin. They also include a variable assessingwhether at least
one of the countries experienced a drought during the past ﬁve
years. This variable is never signiﬁcant. Finally, in addition to
examining absolute scarcity, they make a ﬁrst attempt to assess
relative scarcity in a river-sharing dyad, through a measure of thedistribution of the water resource, the share of the basin in the
upstream state. However, the results in analyses with this variable
are inconclusive.4
All in all, the impact of scarcity, relative or absolute, on the risk
of conﬂict, remains unclear, mainly due to insufﬁcient data. We
acknowledge the need for better data on precipitation and time-
varying measures of river discharge or runoff to enable testing
the real water availability. Similarly, improvedmeasures for relative
scarcity are needed. Both of these will be important contributions
to understanding river management, but remain outside the scope
of the present project. Furthermore, the lack of consistent ﬁndings
with respect to scarcity can also be due to the complexity of shared
waters discussed above. Water scarcity can be a source of conten-
tion in arid regions, but in humid regions water may be a potential
source of conﬂict for other reasons, such as hydropower, ﬁshing,
navigation, or pollution. Although overall water availability is likely
to affect interaction, this is likely to be especially true when access
to the resource is unequal. It is plausible that grievances are
particularly likely to occur when one or more states can attribute
their own insufﬁcient water access to the use from another riparian
that controls more of the resource, or controls it ﬁrst, and thus have
uninterrupted access. Grievances are likely to be reinforced when
one’s own perceived inadequate access can be blamed on someone
else’s use (or overuse), and can also be strengthened through
deliberate scapegoating from state leaders as diversion acts. The
perceived level of scarcity is thus the operative term, as it indeed can
occur irrespective of whether there actually exists a real scarcity,
deﬁned in absolute terms.
In the analyses below we apply several measures to assess water
availability and the size of the shared resource, but our main focus in
this article is touse the improveddataonglobal riverbasins to reassess
the question of the impact of sharing a river on conﬂict risk in a dyad.
The Owen et al. (2004) dataset is more complete than the Toset
dataset since it includes non-contiguous dyads, but it is still
incomplete. First, it leaves out several river basins included in the
TFDD river basin database (TFDD, 2010). Second, it turns out that
only “relevant non-contiguous dyads” are included based on
a somewhat unclear selection criterion (Owen et al., 2004: 14f). The
total number of river-sharing dyad-years analyzed in Gleditsch
et al. (2006) is thus 16,774 (for the period from 1880 to 2001)
compared to 13,707 (1816e1992) in the two earlier studies. Even if
there is no evidence of systematic bias in the selection of dyads
included, the number of missing dyads is substantial. Ignoring
these dyads excludes many potentially relevant river-sharing
relationships (such as Egypt and Ethiopia on the Nile and
Thailand and China on the Mekong). Furthermore, we argue that as
all states within a basin share the same hydrological unit irre-
spective of whether any water directly crosses the border between
two given states, they are likely to face issues of joint management
or disputes. For instance, both Slovakia and Slovenia are members
of the International Commission for the Protection of the Danube
River, but no water runs from one to the other.5 In this article we
introduce a substantially revised and updated dataset where we
have recoded all the shared river basins from the TFDD (2010) into
a dyadic format, and now have 29,490 river-sharing dyad-years in
our analysis in the period 1885e2001.
In addition to insufﬁcient data, there is a problem with the
analysis in Gleditsch et al. (2006). The authors conclude that
sharing a river increases the chance of conﬂict even when
controlling for contiguity. However, after an initial test with just the
control variables (including three measures of proximity e conti-
guity, length of land boundary, and inter-capital distance e the
authors exclude contiguity from the ﬁnal models. Thus, their ﬁnal
models do not in fact control for contiguity. The length-of-land-
boundary variable correlates highly with contiguity (p > 0.7)
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lead to omitted variable bias. The authors cannot be conﬁdent that
sharing a river is not a proxy for contiguity.
We re-examine the river-conﬂict nexus with an improved
model that provides proper controls for proximity. We apply
a model from Brochmann and Gleditsch (2006). Using the Owen
et al. (2004) dataset, these authors ﬁnd that river-sharing dyads
have more cooperation as well as more conﬂict, in line with the
views of Wolf et al. (2005: 80e95, 203e206). The problem noted
with the data obviously applies to this study as well. A contribution
from this unpublished paper, however, is that it uses the gravity
model as a baseline. We adopt the same procedure here, but ﬁrst
describe the new dataset in greater detail.
The new dyadic shared river basin dataset
The new river basin dataset is an extensively revised and
updated version of the Owen et al. (2004) dataset. It now includes
all river-sharing dyads in the basins included in the Transboundary
Freshwater Dispute Database. The new dataset contains a total of
788 river-sharing dyads in 261 river basins compared to 436 in the
Owen et al. dataset. The number of basins shared within a dyad
ranges from 1 (511 dyads) to 15 (USA and Canada) and 17 basins
(Chile and Argentina).
Furthermore, we have improved the coding of the different
types of river conﬁgurations. In addition to the upstream/down-
stream dyad and the mixed dyad we now also have a category
called the sideways dyad. Upstream/downstream means any dyad
where water runs from state A to state B or vice versa, regardless of
whether A and B are contiguous or not. For instance, Ethiopia is
upstream to Egypt on the Nile although the states are not neigh-
bors. In fact, one of the long-standing disputes on Peter Gleick’s
water conﬂict list is between these two countries, following Ethi-
opian plans for dam construction in the Blue Nile. A mixed rela-
tionship is present if country A is both upstream and downstream
to country B in the same basin or if the river forms the boundary
between two states.6 Finally, a river relationship is coded as side-
ways if the two countries each have a share of the river basin, but
no water runs from A to B or vice versa.7 The rationale for including
sideways dyads is that conﬂict or cooperation may occur because
countries draw on the same resource, even if they are not in direct
bilateral competition with each other. However, we perform
separate analyses without the sideways dyads. Although most of
these dyads were left out of the Owen et al. dataset, a number of
them were included, but erroneously coded as upstream/down-
stream. The new dataset is available in two formats. First, Version
3.0a is a database containing all river-sharing dyads with separate
information on each shared basin. Second, Version 3.0b is in a dyad-
year format. Here the data are collapsed into only one row of
information per dyad per year irrespective of howmany basins they
share. This version is thus ready to mergewith standard undirected
dyad-year datasets. Both datasets are available at our replication
site.8 It is the latter format that will be used in the analysis below.
This dataset has the undirected dyad-year as the unit of analysis
and covers a time span from 1816 to 2007 (although due to limi-
tations in several of the control variables our analysis here will only
cover the period 1885e2001).
Since all information about every river basin shared in a dyad is
collapsed into one row in the dataset, a dyad is considered to be
upstream/downstream if the same state is upstream in all their
shared basins (if they share more than one). If, on the other hand,
two states share several basins and A is upstream in one and B in
another, we code the dyad asmixed. Among the river-sharing dyad-
years in our dataset, 44% are pure upstream/downstream whereas
22% are sideways and the ﬁnal 34% are in the mixed category.The gravity model
The gravity model is a useful tool for investigating the effect of
sharing a river. The gravity model was developed as a general
model of interaction and has been applied to phenomena like
migration and inter-city travel (Zipf, 1949) as well as international
air travel (Gleditsch 1967 and 1968). It is particularly well estab-
lished in studies of dyadic trade (Anderson, 1979; Hegre, 2000).
Conﬂict is a form of interaction e the exchange of negative value
instead of positive value as in trade e so the gravity model is also
a suitablemodel of conﬂict (Hegre, 2008). The gravitymodel asserts
that dyadic interaction is proportional to the product of the coun-
tries’ size and inversely proportional to the distance between them:
Interactionij ¼ k

Sizei*Sizej

Distanceij;
where i and j denote the two countries in the dyad. Following most
of the relevant literature, we test it as a linear model in logarithmic
form. While in the original applications size was measured as
population, gravity models of dyadic trade tend to use economic
size. Here we include both, in order to take account for differences
in wealth. Although including GDP as a measure for economic size
is most common, we use GDP per capita since we also include the
population measure in the same model. Since GDP per capita is
a combination of GDP and population (ln[GDP per capita] ¼ ln
[GDP]  ln[population]), including GDP per capita enables us to
distinguish better between pure size (populous countries tend to
have a high GDP) and level of economic development, or wealth. It
also provides for a more straightforward interpretation and we do
not lose any information (see Hegre, 2008). Thus, our ﬁnal gravity
model is:
lnIij ¼ b0 þ b1lnPi þ b2lnPj þ b3lnGi þ b4lnGj þ b5lnDij þ mij;
where Iij is interaction in the dyad IJ, in our case the risk of conﬂict
between the two states, Pi the population of country I, Gi the GDP
per capita of I, and Dij the inter-capital distance between the two
countries. The bs are the estimated parameters and m the unex-
plained variance. We expect b3, b4, and b5 to have negative signs,
since wealth and distance are both negatively associated with
conﬂict.9 We distinguish between GDP per capita in the smallest
economy and in the largest and the population in the largest and
smallest country. The data for GDP and population are from Oneal
and Russett (2005).
Variables
Dependent variable
Our dependent variable is dichotomous with the value 1 if there
is an onset of a militarized interstate dispute with at least one
fatality (a” fatal MID”) in a dyad in a given year. The data are derived
from the Correlates of War Project. MIDs include a wide range of
low-level hostilities, so we require at least one fatality, to avoid
“attention bias” resulting in overrepresentation of countries with
open media (Toset et al., 2000). Years with continued conﬂict are
coded as 0.
Independent variables
As in Gleditsch et al. (2006) we use two independent variables
to assess the effect of sharing a river in general: First, we apply
a dichotomous variable, shared basin, coded as 1 if the two coun-
tries in a dyad share at least one river basin and 0 otherwise.
Second, as a crude measure of water resources, we include
Table 1
Descriptive statistics for all independent and control variables.
Variable (n) Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Shared basin 113,960 0.26 0.44 0 1
Basin size (ln) 113,960 3.54 6.05 0 16.03
Contiguity 113,960 0.14 0.35 0 1
Distance between capitals
(log)
113,939 7.20 0.83 1.61 8.60
GDP per capita, large
(log)
103,722 8.38 0.99 5.70 10.74
GDP per capita, small
(log)
107,184 7.51 0.92 5.39 10.68
Population, large (log) 113,919 9.82 1.34 3.40 14.05
Population, small (log) 113,942 8.13 1.31 3.14 13.83
Peace history 106,559 0.10 0.23 1 6.94e-18
One democracy 110,361 0.31 0.46 0 1
Two autocracies 107,069 0.28 0.45 0 1
Unconsolidated regime 107,069 0.30 0.46 0 1
Upstream/downstreama 29,490 0.43 0.50 0 1
a Upstream/downstream is measured for river-sharing states only.
Table 2
Cross-tabulation of shared basin and contiguity.
Shared basin Contiguity Total
0 1
0 2274 17 2291
1 337 282 619
Total 2611 299 2910
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total size (in sqkm) of the basin(s) shared by a dyad.
In addition, to investigate the effect of geographical location
along the river, we analyze a subset of the data containing river-
sharing dyads only, and examine the effect of the upstream/
downstream conﬁguration compared to other conﬁgurations. The
variable is named updown takes the value of 1 if a dyad has a pure
upstream/downstream relationship (see pg. 7) and 0 otherwise.
All the river variables are from the new dataset (Brochmann &
Gleditsch, 2012).
Control variables
Apart from the control variables contained in the gravity model,
we include contiguity as an additional indicator of proximity.
Contiguity is coded 1 if the states in the dyad share a land boundary,
with data from COW (2012). Buhaug and Gleditsch (2006) found
distance to be negatively and signiﬁcantly related to interstate war
even when controlling for contiguity and vice versa. Our analysis
conﬁrms that the inclusion of both is crucial for the performance of
the shared basin variable.
For comparison with models of international conﬂict in general
(Bremer, 1992), we include two other standard control variables,
regime type and the history of peaceful relations in the dyad. Peace
history is a decay function containing the number of previous years
without militarized interstate dispute (MID) in the dyad or the time
since the younger of the two countries gained independence.10 This
variable is included as a control for temporal dependence in conﬂict
(Beck, Katz, & Tucker, 1998; Raknerud & Hegre, 1997). Regime type
is included bymeans of four dummy variables with a dyadmade up
of two democracies as the reference category. These variables
originally come from the Polity IV project (Marshall, Jaggers, & Gurr,
2006). We label the variables One democracy, Two autocracies, and
Unconsolidated regime depending on the political make-up of the
dyad.11 Democratic peace theory suggests that we should expect
double-democratic dyads to have less conﬂict and politically mixed
dyads to have more (Gleditsch & Hegre, 1997). In addition, several
authors expect democracies to be better at conserving resources (Li
& Reuveny, 2006; Payne, 1995) and for this reason they should be
less sensitive to changes in water quality or quantity caused by
another state. Democratic upstream states may also be less likely to
take actions that harm downstream states (Bernauer & Kuhn, 2010),
especially if they also are democratic. Gizelis and Wooden (2010)
conclude that democracies are also better able to avoid internal
conﬂicts over water.
Finally, in order to avoid inﬂating the number of units of anal-
ysis, we follow Gleditsch et al. (2006) in limiting the analysis to
dyads within the same ‘continents’,12 since river basins by deﬁni-
tion cannot include countries that are completely separated by
ocean.13 Thus, all single-country islands are also excluded. This
reduces the dataset from 636,834 to 113,960 dyad-years (of which
29,490 share rivers). Descriptive statistics are found in Table 1.
Revisiting the river-conﬂict relationship
One immediate result of the more complete coding of shared-
river dyads from the TFDD is that virtually all contiguous coun-
tries now have shared rivers. In fact, of all the 299 contiguous dyads
in the ﬁnal year of the dataset (2001), only 17 dyads are without
a shared river. This is shown with a cross-tabulation between the
shared basin variable and the contiguity variable in Table 2. We list
these 17 dyads in Appendix 1 and it is immediately evident that this
list is dominated by desert countries and by dyads where at least
one of the countries is very small. In fact, we cannot exclude the
possibility that all neighboring countries share a river (or more),although some of these rivers may be so small or so seasonal that
they fail to get recorded. This result has not been evident from
earlier research and calls for a new approach to investigating
interaction in international river basins in large-n studies where
one also controls for contiguity.
We start with a correlation matrix for shared river and basin size
and the twomeasures for proximity. The results are shown inTable 3.
Although most neighbors share rivers there are also many non-
contiguous states that do so. Overall the correlation between the
variables is not critically high with respect to collinearity problems.
Even if running the models with both contiguity and shared basin
included does not cause statistical problems, conceptually there will
be overlaps in the explanatory power of the two variables. If almost
all neighbors share at least one basin, it is impossible to disentangle
the effect of being neighbors from the effect of sharing a basin. We
discuss the consequences of this further below.
In Table 4 we retest the river-conﬂict relationship by means of
a logistic regression analysis between Shared basin and the onset of
a fatal MID controlling for the full gravity model (Model 4.1), the
gravity model and controls (4.2), the gravity model without the
distance between capitals, but with contiguity (4.3) and, ﬁnally, the
full gravity model and contiguity (4.4). The remaining control
variables are included in Models 2e4.14 It is evident from these
models that it makes sense to apply the gravity model as a baseline
for analyzing international conﬂict. Overall, the gravity variables
(size and distance) signiﬁcantly affect conﬂict risk. Speciﬁcally,
dyads with inter-capital distance in the lowest 10th percentile of
the sample have almost 100% higher probability of conﬂict than
dyads at mean levels.15 Similarly, contiguous states have almost
340% higher probability of conﬂict than non-contiguous states. Size
also matters. Populous states have higher conﬂict risks. States
within the 90th percentile of the data have 27% (the largest state in
the dyad) and 67% (the smallest state in the dyad) higher proba-
bility of conﬂict than states with population at mean level. Wealth
also matters. The probability of conﬂict increases by 31% if the
richest state has a GPD per capita in the 90th percentile rather than
Table 3
Correlation matrix for shared basin, basin size and proximity measures.
Shared basin Basin size
(log)
Distance between
capitals (log)
Contiguity
Shared basin 1.00
Basin size (log) 0.99 1.00
Distance between
capitals(log)
0.51 0.47 1.00
Contiguity 0.65 0.62 0.48 1.00
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the poorest state. The results from the models in Table 4 also show,
like we expected, that sharing a river basin is interconnected with
being proximate states in the international system, and that these
variables overlap. The Shared basin variable is signiﬁcant in the ﬁrst
three models, but not in Model 4.4. In other words, a fully speciﬁed
control for proximity (contiguity and inter-capital distance) renders
the shared basin variable insigniﬁcant.16
Table 5 shows similar models run with basin size instead of
shared basin as the main dependent variable. Again, when
controlling sufﬁciently for proximity, the size of a shared basin does
not signiﬁcantly affect the risk of conﬂict in a dyad, as is evident
from Model 5.4.17
We next ran the same analysis on the post-World War II period
(1946e2001) and for the even shorter post-Cold War period
(1990e2001). The data for the control variables are more reliable
and more complete for the period after World War II, and the
”water war” literature frequently argues that we should expect
competition for scarce resources to increase with growing pop-
ulation and higher consumption, and particularly after the end of
the Cold War where conﬂict was more focused on ideological
dividing-lines. Despite this, the results for the shorter periods are
broadly similar. Above all, shared basin and basin size continue to
be insigniﬁcant with the gravity model and a fully speciﬁed control
for geographical proximity.
Finally, we ran the analysis with sideways dyads ﬁltered out.
These analyses include only dyads that actually exchange water in
one direction or another, or both, and thus are more directly
affected by actions undertaken by the other riparian in the dyad. In
all the eight analyses (for the four models in Tables 4 and 5) the
river variables are insigniﬁcant once we control for both contiguity
and inter-capital distance.
Thus, it is impossible to disentangle the effect of sharing a basin
from the effect of proximity in the international system. On the
contrary, sharing a basin is an intrinsic part of being neighboring
states since almost all neighbors share at least one river basin.Table 4
Logistic regression analyses for shared rivers and conﬂict, controlling for the gravity mo
(4.1) (4.2)
fMID fMID
Shared basin 1.14 (3.83)*** 1.20
Distance between capitals (log) 1.00 (3.80)*** 0.8
Contiguity
GDP per capita, large (log) 0.14 (0.83) 0.16
GDP per capita, small (log) 0.60 (3.00)*** 0.2
Population, large (log) 0.23 (2.17)** 0.20
Population, small (log) 0.50 (5.56)*** 0.44
Peace history 2.3
One democracy 1.84
Two autocracies 1.59
Unconsolidated regime 1.88
Constant 2.21 (1.04) 7.6
Observations 103,427 92,9
Robust z statistics in parentheses.
*signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.Nevertheless, dismissing the possible conﬂict proneness of inter-
national rivers is premature. Sharing a river may be part of what
makes territory worth ﬁghting for and thus contribute to the
ﬁnding that neighbors ﬁght more than other states. We re-ran all
the models for contiguous dyads only as a ﬁrst attempt to address
this question. Sharing a basin remains insigniﬁcant, but the size of
the basin affects whether or not neighbors ﬁght. Among neighbors,
the larger the basin the lower the conﬂict risk.18 If one accepts that
basin size can be a crude proxy for water availability, this ﬁnding is
in line with a neomalthusian scarcity argument. Water resources
are more likely to be fought over where they are less plentiful.19
In the following, we investigate river-sharing states only.
Speciﬁcally, if there are certain aspects of the river that makes
states prone to ﬁght, it makes no sense to compare river-sharing
states to non-river-sharing states. The latter group of states by
deﬁnition cannot have features or aspects related to rivers.
Basin size and upstream/downstream conﬁguration
In addition to testing whether river-sharing states have more
conﬂict than other states and examining the possible effect of the
size of the basin, the earlier river studies (Furlong et al., 2006;
Gleditsch et al., 2006; and Toset et al., 2000) also attempt to
examine the effect of geographic location of the states within
a river basin. However, as noted, in order to examine the possible
effect of an upstream/downstream river conﬁguration compared to
other river conﬁgurations, we should examine river-sharing dyads
only. Arguably, this also pertains to the variable measuring basin
size. It does not make sense to compare the effect of the size of
a basin with dyads that do not share a basin at all. We thus ﬁrst re-
ran all the models in Table 5 for river-sharing states only. In these
models, not reported here in the interest of saving space, we found
that the size of a basin is negatively related to the risk of conﬂict.20
Speciﬁcally, in a full model, similar to Model 6.4 below, except that
basin size is included instead of upstream/downstream, moving
from the mean to the top 95 percentile reduced the probability of
conﬂict by 22%.
Next, to investigate possible effect of the upstream/downstream
conﬁguration among riparians, we re-test the models above for
river-sharing dyads only with the upstream/downstream conﬁgu-
ration as our main independent variable. The results are presented
in Table 6. Upstream/downstream dyads have more conﬂicts than
other river-dyads. Speciﬁcally, dyads that have pure upstream/
downstream relations with respect to their shared river basin(s)
have a 48% higher probability of experiencing conﬂict than other
river-sharing dyads.del and contiguity, all dyads on the same continent, 1885e2001.
(4.3) (4.4)
fMID fMID
(5.43)*** 0.89 (3.36)*** 0.43 (1.61)
0 (5.38)*** 0.61 (4.62)***
1.84 (6.82)*** 1.44 (5.48)***
(1.26) 0.18 (1.38) 0.20 (1.69)*
50 (1.72)* 0.17 (1.33) 0.29 (2.15)**
(2.67)*** 0.04 (0.53) 0.16 (2.26)**
(5.69)*** 0.30 (4.37)*** 0.38 (5.20)***
2 (12.39)*** 2.31 (11.18)*** 2.21 (12.14)***
(5.49)*** 1.78 (5.33)*** 1.87 (5.66)***
(3.69)*** 1.29 (3.05)*** 1.51 (3.61)***
(4.58)*** 1.65 (4.10)*** 1.84 (4.59)***
9 (4.97)*** 11.46 (10.64)*** 8.32 (6.26)***
48 92,948 92,948
Table 5
Logistic regression analyses for basin size and conﬂict, controlling for the gravity model and contiguity, all dyads on the same continent, 1885e2001.
(5.1) (5.2) (5.3) (5.4)
fMID fMID fMID fMID
Basin size (log) 0.06 (2.99)*** 0.07 (4.95)*** 0.04 (1.90)* 0.02 (0.82)
Distance between capitals (log) 1.07 (3.69)*** 0.86 (5.31)*** 0.63 (4.69)***
Contiguity 2.12 (6.77)*** 1.56 (5.66)***
The control variables in the corresponding models in Table 4 are included, but not reported
Constant 1.72 (0.72) 7.49 (4.52)*** 11.38 (10.47)*** 8.17 (6.02)***
Observations 103,427 92,948 92,948 92,948
Robust z statistics in parentheses.
*signiﬁcant at 10%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
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our additional control variables also perform as expected, the
longer two states have had peaceful relations, the lower the risk of
a new conﬂict erupting (17% lower probability of conﬂict among
countries with the longest peaceful relations compared to the
mean), and two democracies have a much lower risk of conﬂict. If
only one of the states in the dyad is democratic or the regimes are
unconsolidated the probability of conﬂict is more than 500% higher
than for two democracies. Two autocracies have over 300% higher
probability of conﬂict than two democracies.
Discussion
In this article we have re-investigated the river-conﬂict nexus.
Previous research has argued that river-sharing states have a higher
risk of experiencing mutual conﬂict than other states, but we show
the shortcomings of these results. Speciﬁcally we show, with
substantially revised and updated data on all international river
basins, that almost all states in the international system share at
least one river basin. When we re-investigate the effect of sharing
a river basin on conﬂict risk with these new data, the gravity model
as a baseline and sufﬁcient control for proximity, we ﬁnd that
sharing a basin has no added impact on the risk of conﬂict outbreak
in a dyad. The previous results that have captured such an effect are
thus likely to have detected a contiguity effect as it is impossible to
disentangle the effect of sharing a river from the effect of being
proximate states in the international system.
Nevertheless, itwould be premature to reject the argument about
the conﬂict-inducing effect of sharing a river. If Vasquez (1995) is
right in interpreting rivalry over territory as the most plausible
explanation for the robust relationship between contiguity and war,
we still need to establish what aspect of territory is decisive. Is it
territorial identity or territory as a resource? If it is a resource, what
resource: the land, exploitable raw materials e or water? We ﬁnd
that neighbors donotﬁghtmore in general if they share a river, but at
the same time, virtually all neighbors do share a river. In fact, sharing
a river is inherent in the concept of being neighbors in theTable 6
Upstream/downstream conﬁguration and conﬂict risk, controlling for the gravity model
(6.1) (6
fMID fM
Upstream/downstream 0.79 (2.64)*** 0.
Distance between capitals (log) 0.97 (4.03)*** 
Contiguity
The control variables in the corresponding models in Table 4 are included, but not rep
Constant 0.79 (0.42) 
Observations 25,483 23
Robust z statistics in parentheses.
*signiﬁcant at 10%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.international system and it is impossible to disentangle these effects
empirically.Whenweexamine river-sharing states only insteadof all
states,we can uncoverwhether speciﬁc features of riversmake river-
sharing relationships more problematic and consequently contrib-
utes to increase the risk of conﬂict between these states. In a ﬁrst cut,
we do indeed ﬁnd that the upstream/downstream conﬁguration
increases the risk of conﬂict among these states.
We thus call for a different approach to the study of interaction
in international river basins. First, the geographical ﬁnding here
indicates that it matters how a river basin is shared. Structural
scarcity may be at least as important for conﬂict risk as absolute
scarcity. In fact, Elhance (1999: 4) argues that scarcity in itself is not
likely to lead to conﬂict, but it is when an essential resource such as
freshwater is “.rightly or wrongly perceived as being over-
exploited or degraded by others at a cost to oneself, that states may
become prone to conﬂict”. In the same spirit, we suggest giving
more attention to the importance of rivers beyond the question of
the quantity of water, e.g. in relation to ﬁshing, navigation, and
hydropower generation.
Although the present dataset based on the TFDD dataset should
be nearly 100% complete,21 it cannot resolve fully the issue of
whether contiguity merely provides an opportunity factor for
conﬂict, or whether it also plays a role in determining the motive
(or willingness) for war, as Vasquez assumes. We might surmise
that the length of the land boundary could work as a proxy for the
importance of territory generally, but whenwe introduce it into our
models here, it does not eliminate the inﬂuence of contiguity.
Three paths seem particularly promising in further research on
this topic: One is to look to issue coding of conﬂict for indications
that disagreements over the sharing of water resources is the stated
object of the conﬂict. Studying international river claims (explicit
disagreements over the use of rivers at an ofﬁcial level), Hensel and
Brochmann (2007) ﬁnd that water scarcity and greater demands on
water increase the risk of onset of such claims as well as the risk
that theymilitarize. Yet they also ﬁnd that although the existence of
a river treaty among the riparians does not prevent future water
disagreements, states are more likely to enter into negotiations toand contiguity, all river-sharing dyads, 1885e2001.
.2) (6.3) (6.4)
ID fMID fMID
32 (1.44) 0.42 (1.89)* 0.38 (1.80)*
0.76 (5.07)*** 0.54 (3.93)***
1.74(6.63)*** 1.40 (5.31)***
orted
5.08 (3.04)*** 8.70 (7.13)*** 6.48 (4.54)***
,253 23,253 23,253
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& Hensel, 2009). A weakness of issue coding is, of course, that
statements about the nature of the conﬂict may not reﬂect the ‘true’
intentions of the parties. A second level of issue coding may
perhaps be performed when declassiﬁed state records and
memoirs become available, but for the moment issue coders are
limited to contemporaneous statements by decision-makers and
observers of the conﬂict.
A second path is to continue to develop better measures for water
availability and river salience. Here we apply very crude measures to
get at river importance and water availability but continuing to
improve the quality of time-varying hydrological data will improve
the assessment of the impact of water availability and demand
immensely. The larger the hydrological size of the basin, the more
important it is as a resource for ﬁshing, for navigation, and for
hydroelectric power. Attempts to limit this resource may be a source
of conﬂict, regardless of whether the downstream country is facing
water scarcity in an absolute sense. For instance, Bernauer and
Siegfried (2012) apply hydrological data to a study of potential
conﬂict in the Syr Daria basin in Central Asia. Beyond water quantity,
river salience in a broader sense should be incorporated into the
analyses. Here, case studies from various basins should lead the way
and attempt to uncover which mechanisms may drive river interac-
tion. The ICOW(2012) riverbasinsdataset applies an indexmeasuring
overall river salience, and although an admirable ﬁrst step, more in-
depth knowledge of features driving river interaction is warranted.
Third, more insight can be gained from a closer look at the
asymmetries between upstream and downstream countries. In
addition to the pure geographical asymmetries inherent in the
upstream/downstream conﬁguration, asymmetries in control of
the resource are likely to affect interaction patterns, especially in
combination with political asymmetries in general.
Appendix 1. Contiguous dyads that do not share a riverState A State B
Mauritania Morocco
Mauritania Algeria
Djibouti Eritrea
Tunisia Libya
France Monaco
Libya Egypt
Italy San Marino
Iraq Kuwait
Saudi Arabia Yemen
Saudi Arabia Kuwait
Saudi Arabia Qatar
Saudi Arabia United Arab Emirates
Saudi Arabia Oman
Yemen Oman
Qatar United Arab Emirates
United Arab Emirates Oman
Malaysia SingaporeEndnotes
1 Statement respectively by the then President Anwar Sadat in 1979 and the then
Foreign Minister Boutros Boutros-Ghali in 1988, according to Gleick (1993: 86).
2 However, the argument that water wars are unlikely has also been made by
a number of authors (e.g. Beaumont, 1997; Katz, 2011; Wolf et al., 2005; and Yoffe
et al., 2003).
3 An international river basin is deﬁned as “. all the land that that drains through
a given river and its tributaries into an ocean or an internal lake or sea and includes
the territory of more than one country” (Yoffe et al., 2003: 1110).
4 They run this variable in the models both as an absolute measure and as
percentage of the total basin size. As only the absolute term is signiﬁcant in themodels this is likely to capture a size effect of the basin rather than unequal
distribution. Furthermore, the dataset codes only the size of the largest basin if the
states share more than one. If two river-sharing states are upstream on different
rivers, the unequal distribution is not captured. Finally, instead of comparing river-
sharing dyads only, they include all dyads. This makes it difﬁcult to draw any
conclusions about the effect of an uneven distribution compared to states with
a more equal river distribution.
5 Cf. www.icpdr.org/icpdr-pages/countries.htm, downloaded 25 November 2011.
6 For instance, a stretch of the Rhine forms the boundary between France and
Germany.
7 As noted above, Slovenia and Slovakia are located “sideways” in the Danube.
8 For more details about the data and coding procedures, see the codebook
(Brochmann & Gleditsch, 2012).
9 Although with respect to wealth the opposite argument can also been made as
wealthier states will have more money to allocate to the military and thus
increased ability to project force (Gartzke, 2007; Kennedy, 1988).
10 The variable is deﬁned ase(2
ˇ
(eyears of peace)/a)wherea is a halfelife parameter.
We choosea¼2 asweassume the conﬂict increasingeffect of a previous conﬂict tobe
halved every second year (see Gleditsch et al., 2006: 14, fn. 12).
11 For a dyad to be labeled one democracy, one of the countries has to have a value
of 6 or higher on the Polity scale. In Two autocracies, both countries have e6 or
lower. In unconsolidated dyads at least one of the countries has a value betweene
5 and 5 and the other has 5 or less.
12 Eight “continents” are coded: North America (all countries from Panama and
northwards), South America (all countries from Colombia and southwards), His-
paniola (Haiti and Dominican Republic), Africa (including Egypt), United Kingdom
and Ireland, Western Eurasia (includes Russia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and
Turkey and all European countries further west), Eastern Eurasia (includes Russia,
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey and all countries further east), and
Indonesia (with two islands shared by several countries, Borneo and New Guinea e
leaving out Timor, since East Timor did not become independent until 2002).
Cyprus might have been coded as continent no. 9. However, the Turkish Republic of
Northern Cyprus, de facto independent since 1983 is not recognized by any country
other than Turkey. If North Cyprus is coded as Turkey, Turkey becomes part of three
continents. We have solved this problem by eliminating Cyprus from our dataset,
i.e. treating it as a single-nation island.
13 The analyses are also run for all dyads, but the results do not differ signiﬁcantly.
14 All the ﬁnal models are estimated with robust standard errors clustered on
country dyads.
15Marginal effects are calculated using the Clarify software (Tomz, Wittenberg, &
King, 2003) for a speciﬁc interval on the independent variables’ values while
holding the other variables constant. The baseline value is set to be the variable’s
mean if it is a continuous variable and 0 if it is dichotomous. The interval extends
from the baseline and to the 90th or the 10th percentile for the continuous vari-
ables and from 0 to 1 for the dummies.
16We also ran a ﬁxed-effects model to control for dyad-speciﬁc factors, but sharing
a basin remained insigniﬁcant.
17 Although not reported, all models in Table 4 are runwith the same controls as the
corresponding model in Table 3.
18 The results of these analyses are not reported here, but will be made available
through the replication do ﬁle upon publication.
19However, the geographical size of a basin is at best, a very crude measure for
water availability. Research on the effects of climate change frequently uses rainfall
to assess possible scarcity, as did Gleditsch et al. (2006). They also applied
a measure of drought. We re-ran our analyses with the measures of average rainfall
and drought and found that whereas whether or not there has been a drought in
the dyad does not matter for conﬂict risk, less rain increases the risk of conﬂict. The
conﬂict-inducing effect of low rainfall seems to be mediated somewhat if the
countries in the dyad share a river basin, as an interaction term between sharing
a river and rainfall is positive. Thus, low rainfall has a conﬂict-inducing effect
mainly in states that do not share a river.
20 The full analysis can be obtained from the replication ﬁle posted at www.prio.no/
cscw/datasets.
21 As pointed out by Gleditsch et al. (2006: 366, fn. 2) a few small boundary-
crossing rivers in Europe are missing in TFDD, for instance between Norway and
Sweden, but there is no reason to believe that this affects our results.
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